Statement of John T. Lampe, Executive Vice President, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., to the House Commerce Committee Subcommittees on Oversight and Investigations and Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection

21 September 2000
    WASHINGTON, Sept. 21 The following statement was issued
today by John T. Lampe, Executive Vice President of Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., to the House Commerce Committee Subcommittees on Oversight and
Investigations and Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection:

    Chairman Tauzin, Chairman Upton and members of the House Commerce
Committee, Bridgestone/Firestone is pleased to have the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss some very important issues regarding the tire
recall situation.
    Let me repeat at the outset that BFS recognizes that there was a problem
with a very small percentage of the recalled tires. That is why we took the
action that we did.  Before going into the substance of my remarks, let me
tell you that this recall situation has impacted our company as no other event
has in our 100 year history.  We are a proud company with a century long
tradition of customer service and satisfaction.  The fact that our customers
are now questioning our commitment to them and to their safety has shaken us
to our core.  We are fully committed to concluding this recall as quickly as
possible and to identifying the cause or causes of the tire problems.
    I will limit my opening remarks to three subjects -- Recommended PSI for
tires to be equipped on the Explorer; how tires are tested; and a brief update
on the root cause analysis of the problems with the recalled tires.
    First, air pressure.  As is the case with all vehicles, the vehicle
manufacturer sets the air pressure on the Explorer.  Why?  Because the vehicle
is an integrated system and the tires are only a part of that system.  Air
pressure of the tire is interrelated with many performance characteristics,
including handling, rollover stability, traction, suspension, and load.  We
are not vehicle experts and cannot know what impact various pressure settings
will have on the vehicle system as a whole.  Typically, from our perspective,
if the inflation level meets Tire and Rim load standards at 26 PSI and the
vehicle manufacturer believes that 26 PSI is optimal for the vehicle's
performance, we must rely on that judgment.
    However, we now know that at 26 PSI, there is a low safety margin for the
Explorer as compared to other SUV's.  Running an Explorer at low tire
pressures, overloaded, particularly in hot climates appears to be a part of
the problem we are now facing.  Since August 9, Ford has stated that an
inflation pressure range of 26 PSI to 30 PSI is proper for the P235 75R 15
tires equipped on the Explorer and we, as the tire manufacturer, have
recommended that the air pressure on these tires equipped on the Explorer be
inflated to 30 PSI.  We believe that 30 PSI provides the consumer with
additional safety margin; at 30 PSI, the Explorer can handle higher speeds and
over 400 lbs. greater load than at 26 PSI.
    Turning to testing, Firestone knows how to test tires.  Every year we test
thousands of tires for millions of miles at different loads, speeds and
inflation levels.  We subject test tires to severe abuse and test to create
failure, so we can assess the outer limits of a tire's ability to perform.
    The recalled tires were subjected to a series of exacting tests before
they were introduced.  First, Ford Motor Company required a series of tests
before the tires could be certified as original equipment on Ford vehicles.
Those tests were performed either by Ford or by Firestone, as directed by Ford
in its engineering specifications.  Second, Firestone tested the tires in
accordance with DOT regulations, which call for high speed, durability, and
other tests.  Third, at Ford's request starting with the 1995 model year,
Firestone tested the tires under standards developed by the Society of
Automotive Engineers for purposes of speed rating the tires.  The recalled
tires performed just the way they should on these tests and were ultimately
approved by Ford.
    In addition to this extensive testing, Firestone's quality assurance
procedures require regular testing of tires taken from the production lines to
assure the continuing safety of tires produced.
    Overall, the testing Ford and Firestone undertook before introducing these
tires was thorough and complete.  However, we pledge our cooperation with the
Committee and with NHTSA in re-evaluating tire testing standards and in
addressing the critical matter of tire and vehicle interaction in accident
causation.
    Let me speak a moment about root cause.  After the recall was announced,
Bridgestone/Firestone management immediately created an investigative team to
study and determine the cause of the tread separation phenomena.  They were
joined by groups of personnel from the Decatur, IL plant, professionals from
the Akron Technical Center, and field engineers and technical experts from
around the United States as well as from our parent company Bridgestone
Corporation, Japan. A team of Ford Motor Company specialists has also
participated in that effort.  All of these groups have continued to work both
individually and jointly in search of an answer to this problem.
    No one wants to have an answer more than we do.  We have been and are
continuing to relentlessly examine all known facts relevant to these tires.  A
comprehensive review of the Decatur production process has been conducted to
determine whether variances in any production process could have caused or
contributed to this problem, which appears in such a small percentage of these
tires.  We have engaged in an intensive review of our development and design
processes to determine any role they might play in these issues.  We are
presently examining, dissecting, and analyzing a large sample of
representative tires acquired in the recall in an effort to closely evaluate
the condition of tires that have experienced actual service conditions.
    At this time, I want to make it clear that we have not been able to come
to any conclusion about the cause or causes of this rare problem, although we
have identified some areas where we believe additional work will be fruitful.
Specifically, we are looking at the interaction between the design of the
P235/75R15 and potential manufacturing variances at the Decatur plant.  It
would be inappropriate on my part to engage in further speculation.  We must
allow our experts, including the independent expert, Dr. Sanjay Govindjee, the
unfettered opportunity to investigate and answer this problem, which has been
aptly likened to "finding a needle in a haystack."
    Mr. Chairman, we pledge our cooperation with the Committee and with NHTSA
to work to ensure the safety of the motoring public.  Thank you for your time
and we welcome any questions the Committee has.  Joining me here today are Dan
Saurer, Division Vice President, Technology Company, and Brian Queiser,
Project Engineer, who will address any of the more technical questions you may
have.